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Probability and nonclassical logic J. Robert G. Williams
Classical tautologies have probability 1. Classical contradictions have probability 0. These
familiar features reflect a connection between standard probability theory and classical logic.
In contexts in which classical logic is questioned—to deal with the paradoxes of
self-reference, or vague propositions, for the purposes of scientific theory or metaphysical
anti-realism—we must equally question standard probability theory.1
Section 1 covers the intended interpretation of ‘nonclassical logic’ and ‘probability’. Section 2
reviews the connection between classical logic and classical probability. Section 3 briefly
reviews salient aspects of nonclassical logic, laying out a couple of simple examples to fix
ideas. Section 4 explores modifications of probability theory. The variations laid down will be
motivated initially by formal analogies to the classical setting. In section 5, however, we look
at two foundational justifications for the presentations of ‘nonclassical probabilities’ that are
arrived at. Sections 6-7 describe extensions of the nonclassical framework: to
conditionalization and decision theory in particular. Section 8 will consider some alternative
approaches, and section 9 evaluates progress.
1 Preliminaries
Our topic is the interaction between nonclassical logic and probability. But ‘nonclassical logic’
and ‘probability’ in what sense?
In the following sections, we operate with a fairly narrow understanding of non-classicality.
For present purposes a nonclassical logic is one that diverges from classical orthodoxy on
which arguments (sequents of sentences) or inferential rules are valid or invalid. An example
of a classically valid argument might be disjunctive syllogism: A,¬A∨B |= B. A rule of
inference (in the technical sense that contrasts with this) involves a transition from one validity
to another. Conditional proof is an example: this tells us that if A,B |=C then also A |= B →C.
Nonclassical logics might declare one or the other, or both, invalid. For our purposes, the
sentences in question can (usually) be thought of as drawn from a standard propositional
language containing negation, disjunction, conjunction and a conditional.
A second sense of nonclassicality pertains to semantics. A theory is nonclassical in this sense
if it diverges from classical orthodoxy on what truth statuses there are or how they can be
distributed. Classical semantics endorses bivalence—every meaningful sentence is either true
or false. A nonclassical semantics may allow for sentences which are neither true nor false; or
for intermediate degrees of truth. This is not nonclassicality in logic strictly speaking; but the
two forms of nonclassicality are intimately related and I will discuss both.2
1For the paradoxes of self-reference, (Field, 2008) provides a recent survey of nonclassical approaches. For
vagueness, see inter alia (Williamson, 1994; Keefe, 2000; Smith, 2008). (Hughes, 1992) is a relatively accessible
approach to the issues surrounding quantum logic, with chs.7 and 8 particularly pertinent to our concerns. For
metaphysical anti-realism and logic, a locus classicus is Dummett (1991).
2Supervaluationism is perhaps the leading example of a nonclassical semantics that is paired with what might be
argued to be a classical logic. Supervaluational semantics allows for truth value gaps. But, as standardly presented,
across a standard propositional (or indeed quantificational) language, the associated ‘global’ supervaluational logic
coincides with classical consequence. The issue is subtle, however. The supervaluational multiconclusion con-
sequence relation diverges from the classical analogue. And across a minimally enriched language (including an
object-language truth or definiteness operator) classical inferences rules such as conditional proof fail (Williamson,
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A broader reading of ‘non-classical logic’ would include the logic of operators and
connectives beyond the usual propositional list. Modal, temporal and conditional logics are
paradigms of this kind of departure from classicality.3 This broad reading won’t be the focus
of our discussion, but the interested reader is directed to the result from (Paris, 2001) quoted in
section 3. To a first approximation, the result shows that unless we have nonclassicality in the
narrow sense, the theory of probability is unchanged (a remarkable result in its own right!).
Like nonclassicality, what we call ‘probability’ can vary along several dimensions. The first
dimension of variation is the kind of phenomenon in question—perhaps rational belief, or
objective chance, or degree of evidential confirmation.4 In the sections below we focus on a
subjective interpretation of probability. On this picture, subjects have beliefs that come in
degrees. The probabilist then maintains that to be ideally rational, the distribution of these
degrees of belief must be probabilistic—i.e. satisfy the probability axioms. Alternative
interpretations are considered in the penultimate section of this survey.
A second dimension of variation concerns the items that probabilities attach to. We can choose
between investigating probabilities that attach to fine-grained entities such as sentences; or
alternatively coarse grained entities like sets of outcomes (‘events’). Here I take the
fine-grained approach. Indeed, I will mostly talk of probabilities attaching to sentences. One
advantage, against a standard background on which logical and alethic properties attach to
sentences, is that we can cleanly formulate principles that connect logic and probability
without worrying about the relationship between the relata of the logical consequence relation
and the bearers of probability. We can simply say, for example, that if a sentence is
tautologous, its probability must be 1. On the other hand, given the commitment to a subjective
interpretation of probability the choice may seem odd. If ideal degrees of belief have to be
probabilistic, it seems this requires the objects of propositional attitudes to be
sentences—while believers in ‘mentalese’ should be happy with this, most others will not.
But there isn’t a deep worry here. Suppose you hold that objects of attitudes are Fregean
thoughts or Russellian structured propositions. You can then straightforwardly adapt the
discussion below to your preferred setting. You already owe an account of the logic and
truth-conditions of your favoured truth-bearers (and typically this can be a straightforward
adaption of the usual treatment of the logic and semantics for sentences (cf. e.g. Soames,
1989)). This could be classical or nonclassical. That your truth bearers plausibly have their
truth-conditions essentially doesn’t prevent us from describing unintended interpretations and
using them to characterize a logic in the usual model-theoretic way. The logic-probability
connections appropriate to such settings will be a straightforward transcription of the
sentence-based formulations below. (The real issue here is whether the motivations for
nonclassicality extend to the propositional level. Some hold that propositional truth-conditions
are broadly classical, with nonclassicality arising from the sentence-proposition relation. A
case in point are treatments of reference failure which make some sentences truth-value gaps,
but only because the sentences express no proposition—the propositions themselves remaining
bivalent.)
1994, ch.5). Supervaluational logic is a genuinely hard case to categorize (cf. Williams, 2008).
3For an example of this usage of ‘nonclassical’, and an introduction to non-classical logics in both the narrow
and broad sense, see (Priest, 2001).
4Cf. Hájek (Summer 2012), and the chapters in this volume on The classical interpretation and indifference
principles, Frequentism, The propensity interpretation, Best system approaches to chance and Subjectivism.
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One radical and minority view on the objects of belief is the ‘ultra coarse-grained’ treatment of
propositions argued for by Lewis (1986) and Stalnaker (1984). In one version, the propositions
we take attitudes to are identified with sets of possible worlds—the possible worlds at which
the sentence is true. This does motivate a rather different view of the relation between logic
and probability—one to which we return in the penultimate section of the paper.
2 The classical framework
Consider a colour swatch, Patchy. Patchy is borderline between red and orange. The classical
law of excluded middle requires the following be true:
(LEM) Either Patchy is red, or Patchy is not red.
Many regard (LEM) as implausible for borderline cases like Patchy—intuitively there is no
fact of the matter about whether Patchy is red or not, and endorsing (LEM) suggests otherwise.
This motivates the development of nonclassical logic and semantics on which (LEM) is no
longer a logical truth.5 But if one doubts (LEM) for these reasons, one surely cannot regard it
is a constraint of rationality that one be certain—credence 1—in it, as classical probabilism
would insist. One does not have to be a convinced revisionist to feel this pressure. Even one
who is (rationally) agnostic over whether or not logic should be revised in these situations, and
so has at least some inclination to doubt LEM, should not accept that non-probablistic
belief-states are irrational.6
We can view the distinctively classical assumptions embedded in standard probability theory
from at least two perspectives. First, the standard axiomatization of probability (over
sentences) makes explicit appeal to (classical) logical properties. Second, probabilities can be
identified with convex combinations or expectations of truth values of sentences, where those
‘truth values’ are assumed to work in classical ways. We briefly review these two perspectives
below in the classical setting, before outlining in the next section how these may be adapted to
a nonclassical backdrop.
The following is a standard set of axioms for probability over sentences in the propositional
language L:7
P1c. (Non-negativity) ∀S ∈ L,P(S) ∈ R≥0
5The literature on this topic is vast. Two representatives of the contemporary debate are (Wright, 2001) and
(Smith, 2008). Williamson (1994) is the most influential critic of nonclassical approaches in this area.
6The connection between logic and probability in these contexts is a major theme of Hartry Field’s work in
recent times. See Field (2000, 2003b,a, 2009).
7An alternative approach to axiomatizing probability, starting from suggestions by Popper, dispenses with
the appeal to consequence, and works directly on constraints on the interaction of probability with connectives.
One appealing feature of this is that one could then use probability functions so characterized as a resource for
characterizing consequence. This approach has been vigorously pursued, and there are a number of extensions
to nonclassical settings, such as intuitionism. See (Roeper & Leblanc, 1999) for a survey of both classical and
nonclassical work in this tradition. The focus on ‘purely logical’ axiomatizations below is in a sense the dual of
this approach.
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P2c. (Normalization) For T a (classical) logical truth, P(T ) = 1
P3c. (Additivity) ∀R,S ∈ L with R and S (classically) inconsistent, P(R∨S) = P(R)+P(S).
Various theorems of this system articulate further relations between logic and probability:
P4c. (Zero) For F a (classical) logical falsehood, P(F) = 0;
P5c. (Monotonicity) If S is a (classical) logical consequence of R, P(S)≥ P(R);
Believers in the so-called Regularity constraint on probability functions endorse yet more
logical constraints on probability. They endorse the converse of (Normalization) and (Zero),
saying that only logical truths/falsehoods take extremal probability values. I won’t discuss
those views further here.
(Normalization) is problematic for the logical revisionist who seeks to deny the law of
excluded middle: under our interpretation of probability, it says that rational agents must be
fully confident in each instance of excluded middle. But it is not the only problematic
principle. Advocates of some popular nonclassical settings say that (LEM) is true, but assert
the following Truth Value Gap claim:
(TVG) It’s not true that Patchy is red, and it’s not true that Patchy is not red.
On this—supervaluation-style—nonclassical setting, a disjunction can be true, even though
each disjunct is untrue.8 This motivates allowing high confidence in ‘either Patchy is red or
Patchy isn’t red’, and yet ultra-low confidence in each disjunct. But this violates (Additivity).9
Still other, dialethic, nonclassical settings allow contradictions to be true. Let L be the liar
sentence (“this sentence is not true”). Some argue that the following holds:
(TC) L∧¬L
Advocates of this view presumably have reasonably high confidence in (TC). But (Zero) rules
this out.10
8Some further details are given later. For supervaluations, see inter alia (van Fraassen, 1966; Fine, 1975; Keefe,
2000).
9Compare (Field, 2000). I note that sometimes, it is assumed that a ‘supervaluational style’ approach motivates
not low credence but an imprecise credence. This is an illustration of a theme I will emphasize later—that formally
similar systems may allow for multiple interpretations (so ‘supervaluationism’ may very well pick out not a single
system, but multiple such. The results below will show, however, how well the low-confidence model fits with
standard supervaluational rhetoric, including the identification of truth with supertruth, and the appeal to global
supervaluational consequence as the preferred consequence relation.
10See (Priest, 2006), who explicitly discusses the modifications of standard probability theory required to ac-
commodate paraconsistent logics.
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(Monotonicity) inherits problems both from (Zero) and (Normalization). Since A∨¬A
classically follows from anything, (Monotonicity) tells us that rational confidence in excluded
middle is bounded below by our highest degree of confidence in anything. And since L∧¬L
classically entails anything, (Monotonicity) tells us that rational confidence in the conjunction
of the liar and its negation is bounded above by our lowest degree of confidence in anything.
But revisionists object: one such revisionist thinks we should have higher confidence that
hands exist (for example), than in sentence (LEM). Another thinks we should have lower
confidence in the moon being made of green cheese than we do in the conjunction of the liar
and its negation.
Finally, what of (Non-negativity)? Many revisionists will find this unproblematic; notice that it
doesn’t appeal to (classical) logical relations explicitly at all. But the assumption that
(subjective) probabilities are non-negative real numbers builds in, inter alia, that rational
degrees of belief are linearly ordered. It’s not crazy to question this assumption in a
nonclassical setting. To take one example: MacFarlane (2010) argues that certain graphs,
rather than point-like credences, capture our doxastic states in the nonclassical setting he
considers.
The obvious moral from this brief review is that it would be madness for a logical revisionist to
endorse as articulating rationality constraints on belief a probability theory that is based on
the ‘wrong’ logic. A natural thought is to generalise the axiomatizations by switching out the
appeal to classical consequence in favour of one’s favoured non-classical consequence. This is
indeed the core of the approach explored below—but notice it cannot always be the whole
story. The problems for (Additivity) in the supervaluational setting arise even though the
relevant sentences remain inconsistent.
We turn now from axiomatics to the second perspective. This connects probabilities not to
logic but directly to truth values. We presuppose an ‘underlying’ credence function on a
maximally fine-grained partition of possibilities (“worlds”). For simplicity, we take this to be
finite. The only constraints imposed on this underlying credence is that the total credence
invested across all possibilities sums to 1, and that the credence in a given possibility is never
less than 0. Sentences are true or false relative to these worlds. Let |S|w be a function that takes
value 1 iff S is true at w, and value 0 iff S is false at w—this we call the truth value of the
sentence at w. Each underlying division of credence c then allows us to define a function from
sentences to real numbers:
f (S) := ∑
w
c(w)|S|w
It turns out that such f s are exactly the probabilities over sentences. Some terminology: when
a function f is a ‘weighted average’ of functions gi, with weights given by coordinates λi ≥ 0
(with the λi summing to 1), we say that f is a convex combination of the gi. Letting the worlds
w play the role of the indices i, and setting gw = |S|w and λi = c(w), the equation above meets
this condition. Classical probabilities are convex combinations of classical truth values. We
can also think of the probability of S so characterized as the expectation of S’s truth value,
relative to the underlying credence defined over worlds. 11 We’ll call this the
11For those familiar with probability theory: we treat the worlds as the sample space for the probability function
c, and then for any sentence S consider a random variable t(S) whose value at w is equal to |S|w. Where there are
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convex-combination characterization of probability.
In characterizing probability this way, the association of 1s and 0s with truth statuses truth and
falsity is crucial. The True and the False can’t themselves be arithmetically manipulated;
whereas the arithmetical manipulations of 1 and 0 make perfect sense. So why call these ‘truth
values’ (Howson, 2008)? The answer I will explore—and extend to the nonclassical case—is
that this representation is justified only because they are the degree of belief that omniscient
agents should invest in S, in situations where S has that truth status. They reflect the
omniscience-appropriate cognitive states; the ‘cognitive loading’ of the classical truth statuses.
Since convex combinations of (classical) truth values lead to our familiar probability functions,
all the problematic consequences for the logical revisionist arise once again. The revisionist
faced with the convex-combination characterization of probabilities will pinpoint the appeal to
classical truth value distributions as what causes the trouble. Faced with classical axiomatics,
the natural strategy is to consider revised principles appealing to a nonclassical consequence
relation. Faced with the convex-combination characterization, the natural strategy is to explore
variations where nonclassical truth value distributions are appealed to.
3 Nonclassical logic and semantics
Nonclassical logic and semantics comes in a wild and wonderful variety.12 Although the
results to be discussed shortly will apply to a large variety of settings, including those with (for
example) infinitely many truth values, to fix ideas I set out a three-valued setting that allows us
to characterize a handful of sample logics. A Kleene truth status assignment involves, not a
scattering of two statuses (Truth, Falsity) over sentences, but a scattering of three—call them
for now T , F and O. The distribution over compound sentences must accord with the (strong)





A∧B T O F
T T O F
O O O F
F F F F
A∨B T O F
T T T T
O T O O
F T O F
(In the last two tables, the horizontal headers represent the truth status of A, and the vertical
headers the truth status of B, and corresponding entry the resultant truth status of the complex
sentence.) We have various options for characterizing logical consequence on this basis:
only finitely many worlds, the full technology of a worldly probability space isn’t needed. But if there are infinitely
many worlds we can still appeal to expectations of truth value, relative to the underlying credence.
12For a general introduction to nonclassical logics, including the Kleene logic and LP discussed below, see
(Priest, 2001) and for further philosophical discussion, see (Haack, 1978).
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Kleene logic: A ⊢K B iff on every Kleene truth status assignment,
if A is T , then B is T too.
LP: A ⊢L B iff on every Kleene truth status assignment,
if A is T or O, then B is T or O too.
Symmetric logic: A ⊢S B iff on every Kleene truth status assignment,
if A is T , then B is T ; and if A is T or O, then B is T or O.
However we characterize consequence, logical truths (tautologies) are those sentences that are
logical consequences of everything; logical falsehoods are those sentences of which everything
is a logical consequence; an inconsistent set is a set of sentences of which everything is a
logical consequence. The strong Kleene logic is a simple example of a nonclassical logic
where excluded middle is no tautology: if A has status O, then so will ¬A, and looking up the
truth table above, so will A∨¬A. But then this provides a Kleene-logic countermodel to the
claim that A∨¬A follows from everything, since any case where B has value T and A∨¬A
value O is a countermodel to B ⊢K A∨¬A. By contrast, excluded middle will be a tautology on
the LP understanding of consequence. A∨¬A can never have the status F ; and that suffices to
ensure it follows from everything on the LP definition. But LP provides us with a simple
example of a paraconsistent logic—one on which explicit ‘contradictions’ L∧¬L do not
‘explode’—they do not entail everything. The symmetric characterization has both
features—contradictions are not inconsistent/explosive and excluded middle is no tautology.
What shall we make of these T s, Fs and Os? In the classical setting, we ordinarily assume that
(in context) sentences are true or false simpliciter—that these are monadic properties that
sentences (in context) either possess or fail to possess. Truth status distributions represent
possible ways in which such properties can be distributed. We could regard the Kleene
distributions in the same way. The picture would then be that rather than two monadic alethic
properties, there are three; but we can still ask about what the actual distribution is, and about
the nature of the properties so distributed. Perhaps such information would motivate one choice
of logic over another. A nonclassical logic motivated this way we call semantically driven.
But one needn’t buy into this picture, to use the abstract three-valued ‘distributions’ to
characterize the relations ⊢K , ⊢L and ⊢S. Hartry Field has argued for such a
non-semantically-driven approach to logic in recent times. Semantics for Field does not
involve representing real alethic statuses that sentences possess. It is rather an instrumental
device that allows us to characterize the relation that is of real interest: logical consequence
(Field, 2009, passim). He doesn’t propose that we eliminate truth-talk from our language—he
favours a deflationarist approach to the notion—but such talk is not supposed to describe a
range of ‘semantic values’ that sentences possess. For Field, the T s, Fs and Os can remain
uninterpreted, since they’re merely an formal tool used to describe the consequence relation.
And the question of which of these categories a sentence like (LEM) falls into would simply
be nonsense.
Let’s suppose that we do not go Field’s way, but take our nonclassical logic to be semantically
driven, so that sentences have categorical properties corresponding to (one of) T , F and O.
What information would we like about these statuses, in order to further understand the view
being put forward? Consider the classical case. Here the statuses were Truth and Falsity; and
these statuses were each ‘cognitively loaded’: we could pinpoint the ideally appropriate
attitude to adopt to each. In the case of a true sentence this was full belief (credence 1); and in
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the case of a false sentence, utter rejection (credence 0). We’d like to know something similar
about the nonclassical statuses T , F and O. If S has status O, should an omniscient agent invest
confidence in S? If so, to what level? Would they instead suspend judgement? Or feel
conflicted? Or groundlessly guess?
Call a semantics cognitively loaded when each alethic status that it uses is associated with an
‘ideal’ cognitive state. Nonclassicists endorsing a semantically-driven conception of logic may
still not regard the underlying semantics as cognitively loaded. For example: Maudlin (2004)
advocates a nonclassical three valued logic (the Kleene logic, in fact) in the face of semantic
paradoxes, but explicitly denies that there is any cognitive loading at all to the middle status O.
Indeed, he thinks that the distinctive characteristic of O that makes it a ‘truth value gap’ rather
than a ‘third truth value’, is that it gives no guidance for belief or assertion.
The nonclassical logics we will focus on will be semantically driven, cognitively loaded, and
further, will be loaded with cognitive states of a particular kind: with standard degrees of
belief, represented by real numbers between 1 (full certainty) and 0 (full rejection,
anti-certainty). This last qualification is yet another restriction. There’s no a priori reason why
the cognitive load appropriate to nonclassical statuses shouldn’t take some other form—calling
for some non-linear structure of degrees of belief, or suspension rather than positive partial
belief, or some such. Such views motivate more radical departures from classical probabilities
than the ones to be explored below.13
Consider the following three loads of Kleene distributions (numerical values represent the
degree of belief that an omniscient agent should adopt to a sentence having that status):
Status: T O F
Kleene loading: 1 0 0
LP loading: 1 1 0
Symmetric loading: 1 1
2
0
The loads differ on the attitude they prescribe for O under conditions of omniscience: utter
rejection, certainty, or half-confidence respectively. They motivate informal glosses on this
truth status: respectively neither true nor false; both true and false; or half-true. Furthermore,
the loads correspond systematically to the logics mentioned earlier: in each case, logical
consequence requires that there be no possibility of a drop in truth value, where the truth value
is identified with the cognitive load of the truth status. (In the special case where the loads are
simply 1 and 0, this corresponds to the familiar distinction between ‘designated’ and
‘undesignated’ truth statuses, and the characterization of consequence as preservation of
designated status (cf. Dummett, 1959, e.g.).)
We continue to use the three Kleene-based logics as worked examples. But there are many,
many ways of setting up nonclassical logics. So long as the logics are semantically driven, and
truth statuses are cognitively loaded with real values, then our discussion will cover them.
13Three potential examples of this are Wright’s notion of a quandary (Wright, 2001); Macfarlane’s credence
profiles (MacFarlane, 2010) and whatever we should take to be the appropriate response to the partially ordered
values of (Weatherson, 2005).
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4 Probability, truth values and logic
Cognitive loads give a natural way to extend the convex-combination characterization of





Consider the limiting case where c is zero everywhere but the actual world (i.e. conditions of
‘credal omniscience’) The above equation then simplifies to P(S) = |S|w. Under conditions of
omniscience, the subjective probability matches the numerical value assigned as S’s truth
value; hence, that number will be the cognitive load of the truth status. In this way, the Kleene,
LP and Symmetric loads induce three kinds of ‘nonclassical probabilities’, as convex
combinations of the respective truth values.
A nice feature of this approach is that the axiomatic perspective generalizes in tandem with the
convex-combination one.15 Consider the following principles, for parameterized consequence
relation ⊢x:
P1x. (Non-negativity) ∀S ∈ L,P(S) ∈ R≥0
P2x. (Normalization) If ⊢x T , then P(T ) = 1
P3x. (Additivity) ∀R,S ∈ L such that R,S ⊢x, P(R∨S) = P(R)+P(S)
P4x. (Zero) If F ⊢x, then P(F) = 0;
P5x. (Monotonicity) If R ⊢x S, then P(S)≥ P(R);
If we pick the Kleene loads, then these five principles are satisfied by any ‘nonclassical
probability’ (expectation of truth value), so long as we use the Kleene logic (set x = K).
Mutatis mutandis for the LP and Symmetric loads and logics.
It’s useful to add two further principles—extensions and variations on (Additivity)—which are
also satisfied by convex combinations of Kleene truth values:
P6x. (IncExc) ∀R,S ∈ L,P(R)+P(S) = P(R∨S)+P(R∧S)
P7x. (Dual additivity) ∀R,S ∈ L, if ⊢x R∨S, then P(R)+P(S)−1 = P(R∧S)
14See in particular (Paris, 2001) for this strategy. Compare also (Zadeh, 1968) and (Smith, 2010).
15For instances of this observation in specific settings, see e.g. (Weatherson, 2003; Field, 2003b; Priest, 2006).
As we shall see, (Paris, 2001) gives a particularly elegant treatment of many cases.
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In the presence of (Zero) and (Normalization) respectively, plus the assumption that the
conjunction of an inconsistent pair is a logical falsehood, (IncExc) will entail the original
(Additivity) and (Dual Additivity). (Additivity) itself is weak in logics with few or no
inconsistencies, such as LP; if there are no inconsistent pairs of sentences, then the antecedent
is never satisfied, and the principle becomes vacuously true. Dual Additivity is
correspondingly weak in logics with few or no tautologies, such as the Kleene logic. The
weaknesses are combined in the Symmetry logic. But their generalization, (IncExc), makes no
mention of the logical system in play, and so retains its strength throughout.
The connection between convex-combination and logical characterizations illustrated above is
very general. Scatter truth statuses over sentences howsoever you wish, with whatever
constraints on permissible distributions you like. Make sure you associate them with
real-valued ‘cognitive loads’—degrees of belief within [0,1], so that we can straightforwardly
define the notion of possible expected truth value, by letting |S|w be equal to the cognitive load
of the status that S has at w. We consider the following logic:
No drop:
A ⊢ B iff on every truth status assignment w, |A|w ≤ |B|w.
It’s straightforward to check that (P1x), (P2x), (P4x) and (P5x) will then hold of all the
expected truth values.
The status of (Additivity) and its variants is more subtle. These principles make explicit
mention of a particular connective, so it’s no surprise that whether or not they hold depends
how those connectives behave. (IncExc) will hold iff we have the following:16
|A|w + |B|w = |A∨B|w + |A∧B|w
Classical logic, and many nonclassical logics, satisfy this principle. But we cannot assume this
holds generally.
In the classical setting, we had more than just a grabbag of principles satisfied by probabilities:
we had an axiomatization complete with respect to classical expected truth values. An obvious
question is whether some subset of nonclassical variants is complete with respect to
nonclassical expected truth values in a similar way.
Paris (2001) delivers an elegant result on this front. Among much else of interest, he shows
that the nonclassical verisons of (Normalization), (Zero), (Monotonicity) and (IncExc) deliver
complete axiomatizations of a wide range of nonclassical probabilities. The conditions for this
result to hold are that: (i) truth values (in our terminology: the cognitive loads of truth statuses)
are taken from {0,1}; (ii) A ⊢k B is given the ‘no drop’ characterization mentioned earlier; and
(iii) the following pair is satisfied:
16The ‘if’ direction follows by the linearity of convex combinations. The ‘only if’ direction holds by considering
the special case of probability where the underlying credence all lies on a single world, c, and hence the probability
coincides with truth values.
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(T 2) |A|w = 1∧|B|w = 1 ⇐⇒ |A∧B|w = 1
(T 3) |A|w = 0∧|B|w = 0 ⇐⇒ |A∨B|w = 0.
This applies, for example, to the Kleene and LP loads mentioned above, as well as the original
classical case. Its application goes well beyond this: for example, to appropriate formulations
of intuitionistic logic.17
(A side note: this is the theorem that delivers a direct extension of probability theory to many
settings that are nonclassical in the ‘broader’ sense discussed in the introduction, for example,
ones that contain modal, temporal and conditional operators. The standard semantics for such
settings will satisfy (i-iii); and the treatment of conjunction and disjunction satisfies T 2,3.)
Beyond this, it is a matter of hard graft to see whether similar completeness results can be
derived for settings that fail the Parisian conditions (one representative of which is our
Symmetric logic). Drawing on the work of Gerla (2000) and Di Nola et al. (1999), Paris
shows that a similar result holds for a finitely valued (Łukasiewicz) setting and Mundici (2006)
later extended this to the continuum-valued fuzzy setting.18
We have already mentioned supervaluational logics. These are widely appealed to in the
philosophical literature. They arise as a generalization of classical truth values, via the
assumption that the world and our linguistic conventions settle, not a single intended classical
truth value assignment over sentences, but a set of co-intended ones. Sentences are supertrue if
they are true on all the co-intended assignments, and superfalse if they are false on all of them.
This allows supertruth gaps: cases where the assignments for S differ, and so it is neither
supertrue nor superfalse. We shall assume that supertruth has a cognitive loading of 1, and
other statuses have a loading of 0 (compare the Kleene loading earlier). The no-drop logic is
then so-called global supervaluational consequence, ⊢s.
This articulation of supervaluationism delivers the results mentioned earlier. For example, as a
classical tautology, (LEM) is true on each classical assignment, and a fortiori true on the set of
co-designated ones, so it will always be supertrue (value 1). But this is compatible with each
disjunct being a supertruth gap (value 0). Invest credence in a world where this is the case, and
the credences in the disjuncts can be 0 while credence in their disjunction is 1. (Additivity) and
(IncExc) fail.
Axiomatizing the convex-combinations of supervaluational truth values is achieved by a
theorem that Paris gives, drawing on the work of Shafer (1976) and Jaffray (1989). For the
propositional language under consideration, the results show that convex combinations of such
truth values are exactly the Dempster-Shafer belief functions. These may be axiomatized thus:
17For the intuitionistic case, compare Weatherson (2003). Paris reports the general result as a corollary of a
theorem of Choquet (1953).
18The major difference between the 3-valued Kleene based setting and the Łukasiewicz settings is the addition of
a stronger conditional—and this is crucial to the proofs mentioned. It’s notable that Paris provides axiomatizations
not in terms of a ‘no drop’ logic, but in terms of the logic of ‘preserving value 1’. This is possible because the ‘no
drop’ consequence is effectively encoded in the 1-preservation setting via tautological Łukasiewicz conditionals.
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(DS1) ⊢s A ⇒ P(A) = 1
A ⊢s ⇒ P(A) = 0







(where S ranges over non-empty subset of {1, . . . ,m}).19
These kind of completeness results are often sensitive to the exact details of the sentences we
are considering. We do not have a guarantee that the completeness result will generalize when
we add expressive resources to the language. This is one reason why the earlier Paris result,
which applies to all languages equipped with a semantics meeting the stated conditions, is so
attractive.
(DS1-2) are simply the constraints (Normalization), (Zero) and (Monotonicity) that we met
earlier. But DS3 is something new. Sometimes called subadditivity, it is a new, weaker,
member of the (Additivity) family. It’s noticeable that what goes in place of (Additivity) that is
varying from setting to setting, while other principles are held constant. Why is this?
Standard axiomatizations of probability feature principles of two kinds. The first are purely
logical: they make no mention of specific logical connectives, but put constraints on
probability in terms of the logical properties of sentences. (Normalization), (Zero) and
(Monotonicity) are paradigms. The second kind of axioms are immanent to the nonclassical
system, in that they impose constraints on sentences that involve particular logical connectives.
Paradigms of this, imposing direct constraints on the distribution of probabilities over
conjunctions and/or disjunctions, are (Additivity), (IncExc), (Dual Additivity) and (DS3).
Since the treatment of conjunction and disjunction can vary wildly from one nonclassical
system to the next, one would not expect to find wholly general axiomatizations if one works
with immanent axioms—one will have to indulge in case-by-case tailoring of the axioms to the
particular system under investigation (or, as in Paris’s result quoted earlier, impose general
conditions on the semantics of the connectives that ensure that a particular immanent axiom is
satisified).
Are there purely logical axioms in the vicinity of the (Additivity) family? The following are
promising. Say that Γ x-partitions a sentence S if the sum of truth values of the sentences in Γ
always equals the truth value of S at any (nonclassical) x-world. And say that sets Γ and ∆ are
x-recarvings of one another if the sum of the truth values of sentences in Γ are always equal
the sum of the truth values of sentences in ∆.20 With this in hand, we can formulate the
following purely logical constraint on probabilities:21
P8x. (Partition) If Γ is a set of sentences that x-partitions S, then P(S) = ∑γ∈Γ P(γ).
P9x. (Recarving) If Γ is a set of sentences that x-recarves ∆, then ∑δ∈∆ P(δ) = ∑γ∈Γ P(γ).
19Paris’s initial formulation is slightly different, and uses classical logic (p.7), but as he notes this is extensionally
equivalent to current version using the ‘no drop’ logic over the ‘supervaluational’ truth values (p.10).
20In the classical setting, this is a condition that (Joyce, 1998, 2005) calls ‘isovalence’.
21The classical version of (Recarving) is a special case of the principle that Joyce (1998) calls ‘Scott’s axiom’,
tracing it to (Scott, 1964) and (Kraft et al. , 1959). The latter labeled the principle ‘Generalized Additivity’.
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It’s easy to check that the Partition and Recarving Principles hold of all generalized
probabilities.22 Moreover (Partition) entails (Additivity) under Paris’s assumptions T 2 and
T 3, since R and S will then partition R∨S in the relevant sense. (Recarving) entails (IncExc)
under the same assumptions, as they ensure that the set {R∨S,R∧S} recarves {R,S}.
(Partition) and (Recarving) neatly capture the logical structure that lies behind (Additivity),
(IncExc) and the like. What additional power or generalizations one gains from the purely
logical version of these axioms remains to be seen—their power depends on what partitions or
recarvings are available in the particular nonclassical setting under investigation. A good test
would be: can we somehow extract DS3 in a supervaluational setting from these more abstract
principles? A partial result is given in a footnote.23
While Paris-style completeness proofs are interesting and elegant, from a philosophical
perspective, the identification of a reasonably rich body of principles that hold good of
nonclassical probabilities is of philosophical interest even if we can’t show them complete.
Only the most radical Bayesians think that satisfying probabilistic coherence is all that there is
to rationality; and so even if satisfying the axioms sufficed for probabilistic coherence, it
would be contentious to conclude that it sufficed for rationality. On the other hand, so long as
probabilistic coherence is a constraint on rational belief in the nonclassical setting, then what
we learn from the above is that violating certain principles suffices for irrationality. A natural
next question, therefore, is whether the ‘nonclassical probabilities’ that we have identified so
far, have the same claim as classical probabilities in the classical setting to provide constraints
on rational belief.
5 Foundational considerations
In many well-behaved nonclassical settings, we have seen a nice generalization of probability
theory in prospect. But is this just coincidence? Or can we argue that this is the right way to
theorize about subjective probabilities in such a setting?
I will focus on two arguments for ‘probabilism’ familiar from the classical case: the
22We argue for the recarving principle, of which the Partition Principle is a special case. Recall that an arbitrary
generalized probability of any proposition is a convex combination of its truth values, say with parameters λw.
Then ∑δ∈∆ P(δ) = ∑δ∈∆[∑w λw|δ|w] = ∑w λw[∑δ∈∆ |δ|w]. By a parallel argument, ∑γ∈Γ P(γ) = ∑w λw[∑γ∈Γ |γ|w] =.
But by the assumption that Γ recarves ∆, we have for each w: ∑δ∈∆ |δ|w = ∑δ∈Γ |γ|w. So the two sums are identical,
and the identity betwen the probabilities is ensured.
23Suppose we are working with a language with a supervaluational semantics, which includes the supervalua-
tional ‘definitely’ operator D. DS is false when S is false, and also when it is neither true nor false. Otherwise it
is true. First, note that since the D operator ‘screens off’ the nonclassical behaviour of the sentences it attaches to,
we can rerun a standard classical ‘inclusion-exclusion’ argument from the partition principle for the special case of
D-prefixed sentences, obtaining P(
∨m
i=1 DAi) = ∑S(−1)
|S|−1P(
∧
i∈S DAi) for S a non-empty subset of {1, . . . ,m}.
But it turns out in the supervaluational setting that an arbitrary conjunction
∧
i∈S DAi is logically equivalent to the
unprefixed
∧
i∈S Ai. So by monotonicity twice, the RHS of the above can be written ∑S(−1)
|S|−1P(
∧
i∈S Ai). On the
other hand,
∨m
i=1 DAi certainly supervaluationally-entails
∨m
i=1 Ai, so by monotonicity we have the LHS bounded
above by P(
∨m
i=1 Ai). Putting these together, we have DS3.
This result only holds for a language featuring the operator D, whereas Paris’s completeness result was specific
to a propositional language lacking such an operator. It’s possible to investigate strengthened interpretations of
probabilistic constraints that bridge this gap; but for reasons of space I won’t explore this here.
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Dutch-bookability of credences that violate the axioms of probability, and the
accuracy-domination arguments advocated by Joyce (1998, 2009). Jeff Paris has shown how
the first can be generalized, showing that credences that are not convex combinations of truth
value in the relevant sense are Dutch-bookable, and conversely.(Paris, 2001). And for similar
formal reasons, such credences are also ‘accuracy dominated’ (a converse is sometimes
available).24
In the classical case, accuracy domination arguments consist in taking a belief state b, and
assessing it at each world w for its degree of ‘accuracy’. How accuracy should be measured is
the leading issue for this approach; but in all cases, the starting point is to compare a degree of
belief (within [0,1]) to the ‘truth value’ of the sentence in question. But comparing a number
with Truth or Falsity is not terribly tractable. So one standardly compares a given degree of
belief with the cognitive loading of the truth status—how close, overall, the degrees of belief
are to the 1s and 0s that an omniscient (perfectly accurate) agent would have in that world.
The result (relative to many plausible ways of measuring accuracy) is the following: if one’s
beliefs b are not (classical) probabilities, then it is always possible to construct a rival
probabilistic belief state c such that c is more accurate than b no matter which world is actual.
If such accuracy-domination is an epistemic flaw, then only probabilistic belief states can be
flawless. This is offered as a rationale for why subjective probabilities in particular should be
constraints on ideally rational belief.
What’s important for our purposes is that the argument generalizes.25 As earlier, suppose the
cognitive loading of some nonclassical truth statuses are real numbers between [0,1]. We use
the very same accuracy measures as previously, to measure closeness of beliefs to these
nonclassical truth values. And it turns out that if the belief state is not representable as a
convex combination of truth values then it will be accuracy-dominated. The accuracy-based
arguments for probabilism thus offer a justification for the claim that nonclassical
probabilities, as characterized in the previous section, should indeed play the role of
constraints on rational partial belief. (Of course, whether it’s a good justification in either
setting is contested. See (Hájek, 2008a).)
Perhaps the most familiar foundational justification for the claim that rational partial beliefs
must be probabilistic comes from Dutch book arguments. The key claim is that one’s degrees
of belief are fair betting odds in the following sense: if offered a bet that pays £1 if A, and £0 if
¬A, then if you believe A to degree k, then you should be prepared to buy or sell the bet for k.
Suppose that degrees of belief do play this role. Then if b is an improbabilistic belief state,
there is a set of bets—a ‘Dutch book’—such that you are prepared to buy each bet within it,
but which ends up giving you a loss no matter what. Pragmatically viewed, a set of beliefs that
open you up to sure-losses may seem flawed. Alternatively, one might think that the belief
24See (De Finetti, 1974) for the formal background to both results (in the latter case, with a quite different in-
terpretation of its significance). (Williams, 2012a) examines the relation between the two results—it is essentially
identical for the leading ‘Brier Score’ explication of accuracy. In that setting, and in others where accuracy is ex-
plicated by what are known as ‘proper scoring rules’, a converse to the accuracy-domination result is available; no
probability will be accuracy-dominated. For discussion of the philosophical significance of converses to Accuracy
Domination arguments, see (Williams, 2012b). A rather different connection between Dutch book foundations for
probability and nonclassical (intuitionistic) logic is argued for in (Harman, n.d.).
25At least, the results in (Joyce, 1998) generalize. As discussed in (Williams, 2012b) the situation is much more
complex for the main argument in (Joyce, 2009). The variation in proofs is significant, since different assumptions
about the accuracy measure are involved in each case.
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state is flawed because it commits you to viewing the book as both to be accepted (since
consisting of bets that your belief state makes you prepared to accept) and also obviously to be
rejected (since it leads to sure loss). So you are committed to inconsistency.
Dutch book justifications for probabilism, like accuracy domination arguments, are
controversial (see (Hájek, 2008a,b) for a review and extension of criticisms). But
independently of whether they persuade, are they adaptable to our case?
Suppose one has bought a bet that pays out 1 if A and 0 otherwise. If one is in a nonclassical
setting, one can be faced with a situation where A takes some nonclassical truth status. The
returns on such a bet then depends on how the bookie reacts. Call a real number k ∈ [0,1] the
pragmatic loading of a truth status X , just in case the right way for the bookie to resolve such a
bet, given that A has status X , is to give the gambler £k.26 Clearly the pragmatic loading of
classical truth should be 1, and the pragmatic loading of classical falsehood is 0. Just as with
cognitive loads of nonclassical truth statuses, there are many many ways one might consider
assigning pragmatic loads (and just as with cognitive loads, there are pragmatic loads for truth
statuses that don’t fit the above description—the option of ‘cancelling the bet’ for example—as
well as the option to deny that truth statuses have any identifiable pragmatic loading).
Suppose we have real-valued pragmatic loads for truth statuses, however. Then we can make
sense of resolving bets in a nonclassical setting, and can consider what kinds of belief states
are immune from Dutch books. Happily, the answer is just as you would expect: immunity
from Dutch books is secured when (and only when) the belief state is a ‘nonclassical
probability’—a convex-combination of the relevant truth values.27
It’s worth noting that in this last result, the ‘truth value’ of a sentence refers to the pragmatic
loading of the relevant truth status, whereas in the previous results it referred to the cognitive
loading of the truth statuses. If they differed, then we might have inconsistent demands—for
example, if the cognitive loading of the ‘other’ status was 0.5 (omniscient agents are
half-confident in A, when A is O), but its pragmatic loading was zero (one doesn’t receive any
reward for a bet on A, given that it is half-true) then being 0.5 confident in A∧¬A might be
entirely permissible from the an accuracy-domination point of view, but one that makes you
Dutch-bookable. The way to avoid this, of course, is to have cognitive and pragmatic loads
coincide. It is interesting to speculate on whether they should coincide, and if so why. I can
imagine philosophers taking cognitive value as primary, and arguing on this basis that the right
way to resolve bets accords with the pragmatic loading; but I can equally envisage
philosophers arguing that pragmatic loads are primary, and that these give the reasons why a
particular cognitive loading attaches to a truth status. I can also imagine someone who takes
both as coprimitive, but argued (‘transcendentally’) that they must coincide, otherwise
rationality would place inconsistent demands on agents.
Both Dutch book and accuracy arguments—and much of the debate between their advocates
and critics—can be replayed in a nonclassical setting. This should bolster our confidence that
26Compare the stipulations in (Paris, 2001) on the returns of bets in a nonclassical setting. On this description
there’s room for a kind of meta-uncertainty about what the pragmatic loading is—which could be modelled by
allowing a wider class of ‘truth value’ distributions over worlds corresponding to all the possible pragmatic loading
distributions the agent is open to. I won’t explore this further here.
27The result follows from Dutch book arguments for expectations in (De Finetti, 1974) and is interpreted in the
way just mentioned in (Paris, 2001). For more discussion, see (Williams, 2012a).
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we have the right generalization of probability theory for the cases under study. And none of
the results just mentioned make any assumptions about the particular kind of truth value
distributions or logical behaviour of the connectives in question—other that the truth values, in
the relevant sense, lie within [0,1]. These are extremely general results.
6 Conditional probabilities and updating
Subjective probability without a notion of conditional probability would be hamstrung. If we
are convinced (at least pro tem) that we have a nonclassical generalization of probability, then
the immediate question is how to develop the theory of conditional probability within this
setting. Three approaches suggest themselves. The first is simply to carry over standard
characterizations of conditional probabilities, the ratio formula (restricted to cases where
P(A) 6= 0; I often leave such constraints tacit in what follows):
P(B|A) := P(B∧A)/P(A)
The second is to investigate axiomatizations of probability in which conditional probability is
the basic notion (of course, if left unchanged, these lead to classical probabilities). One
investigates variations of these axioms, much as we did for the unconditional case above
(compare Roeper & Leblanc, 1999). Third, we can look to the work we want conditional
probability to do, and try to figure out what quantity is suited, within the nonclassical setting,
to play that role. It is this third approach we adopt here, with a focus initially on the role of
conditional probability in updating credences.
Conditional probabilities will be two-place functions from pairs of propositions to real
numbers, written P(·|·). The key idea will be that this should characterize an update policy:
when one receives total information A, one’s updated unconditional beliefs should match the
old beliefs conditional on A: Pnew(·) = Pold(·|A). If updating on information isn’t to lead us
into irrationality, then a minimal constraint on conditional probabilities fit to play this role is
that the result of ‘conditioning on A’ as above, should be a probability. (It turns out,
incidentally, that straightforwardly transferring the ‘ratio formula’ treatment of conditional
probabilities can violate this constraint.)28
Classical conditionalization on A can be thought of as the following operation: one first sets
the credence in all ¬A worlds to zero, leaving the credence in A-worlds untouched. This,
however, won’t give you something that’s genuinely a probability (for example, the ‘base
credences’ no longer sum to 1). So one renormalizes the credences to ensure we do have a
probability, by dividing each by the total remaining credence P(A).
We could generalize this in several ways, but here is the one we will consider. Take the first
step in the classical case: we wipe out credence in worlds where the proposition is false (truth
28Suppose that we are working within the ‘symmetric/half truth’ nonclassical setting, suppose P(A) = P(¬A) =
P(A∧¬A) = 0.5—which is certainly permitted by the relavant nonclassical probabiltiies. Now consider P(A∧
¬A|A). By the ratio formula, this would be P(A∧¬A∧A)/P(A) = P(A∧¬A)/P(A) = 0.5/0.5 = 1. So Pnew(A∧
¬A) = 1. But no probability (convex-combination of truth values) in this setting can have this exceed 0.5.
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value 0) and leave alone credence in worlds where the proposition is true (truth value 1).
Another way to put this is that the updated credence in w, cA(w) (prior to renormalization) is
given by c(w)|A|w: the result of multiplying the prior credence in w by the truth value of A at
that possibility. Since we have real-valued truth values in our nonclassical settings, we simply
transfer this across. The credence is scaled in proportion to how true A is at a given possibility.
Renormalizing is achieved just as in the classical setting, by dividing by the prior credence in
A.29 Notice that by focusing on how the underlying credence c is altered under
conditionalization, we have guaranteed that the function PA(X) defined by this procedure will
be a convex combination of truth values, and so a nonclassical probability in our sense. We set
P(X |A) := PA(X).



















Certain nonclassical settings already contain the connective ◦—in the classical,
supervaluational, Kleene and LP settings, ∧ plays this role, and so the familiar ratio formula
with relatively familiar conjunctive connectives is derived. A more exciting example is the
main conjunctive connective of the product fuzzy logic (cf. Hájek, 1998) In other settings, it is
a well defined truth function, but would require an extension of the language to introduce. But
it is not automatic that the conditions for ◦ can be met by a truth function, in arbitrary
nonclassical systems. Consider, for example, the Symmetric loading of the Kleene
assignments. A sentence that has the truth status O gets the truth value 0.5. So A◦A would by
construction have to take the truth value 0.25; (A◦A)◦A would have to take the value 0.125,
and so on. But in the symmetric setting, there are no truth statuses that have these loads. (A
fortiori, ◦ is clearly not the Symmetric connective ∧.) The process of conditionalization that
was described works perfectly well in the Symmetric setting as a way to shift from one
29To see this, note that the result of the process is to give a ‘base credence’ over worlds which may add to less
than 1. The sum total is given by ∑w∈W cA(w) = ∑w∈W c(w)|A|w. But by construction this is exactly P(A). Hence
dividing by P(A) will renormalize the base credence, making it sum to 1, after the procedure described above.
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nonclassical probability to another on receipt of the information that A. It’s just that it doesn’t
have a neat formulation that mirrors the ratio formula.30
Much more on these nonclassical conditional probabilities in the fuzzy logic setting is
available in (Milne, 2007, 2009)—who cites (Zadeh, 1968) as the source for the conception.
Milne shows how to provide a synchronic Dutch book argument for this characterization of
conditional probability, relative to the assumption (i) that conditional probabilities give fair
betting odds for conditional bets; (ii) that nonclassical conditional bets are to be resolved a
certain way (in particular, that they are ‘progressively more and more called off’ as the truth
value of the condition gets lower and lower).31 As Milne emphasizes, the assumption (ii) is
crucial; in principle, there are many ways one might consider handling conditional bets in this
setting, which would vindicate different conceptions of conditional probability. (Williams,
2012a) gives a nonclassical generalization of the Teller-Lewis diachronic Dutch book
argument, but (although it gives us non-trivial information) it is even worse at giving leverage
on the crucial case of conditionalizing on sentences that at some worlds take nonclassical
values.
The real test for a proposed generalization of conditional probabilities lies in its
applications—as an update procedure and elsewhere. To give a flavour of some important
ways it generalizes classical conditional probability, we show how some key results generalize.












Further key classical results also carry over:
A. Lemma. Assume that ∀w, |¬A|w = |1−A|w. Then P(C) = P(C ◦A)+P(C ◦¬A).
30Suppose that we have another connective A⊕B that is dual to ◦ in the following sense: |A⊕B|w = |A|w +
|B|w −|A◦B|w. Then, by an earlier note, (IncExc) will hold for probabilities involving ◦ and ⊕ as the conjunction
and disjunction symbols. It’s worth noting that even if a setting has the ◦ connective, it needn’t have its dual. In
supervaluational logic, ∧ coincides with ◦, but ∨ does not coincide with ⊕—as we can see by noting that A⊕¬A,
unlike the supervaluational ∨, always takes truth value zero when both A and its negation have truth value zero.
An alternative way to introduce a disjunction via ◦ is through the De Morgan identity: |A∨B|w = |¬(¬A◦¬B)|w.
In a supervaluational setting, this will be the normal supervaluational disjunction, for which we already know that
(IncExc) does not hold. The general moral is that one can introduce an (IncExc) supporting dual of ◦, but there’s
no guarantee that it exists in a given setting; and one can find a corresponding notion of disjunction that is definable
in any system with ◦ and ¬, but there’s no guarantee that it is dual to ◦ in the way that (IncExc) requires.
31With classical presuppositions, the assumption is that a bet on A conditional on C with prize 1 and price β will
return the prize if AC is the case; will return nothing if AC̄ is the case; and the bet is called off (with a return of
the initial stake) if the condition C is false. In the general case, we need to consider what happens to the bet in
situations when C is partially true. Here is the stipulation: a conditional bet on A given C at prize 1, price β will
have part of the stake is returned, and the potential prize decreased, in proportion to the falsity of C. Modulo this,
the returns depend on As truth value as in the categorical case. The overall return of the unit bet above is therefore
|C|w(|A|w −β) at w. The philosophical premise we need is that the fair price for a conditional bet so construed is
exactly the conditional probability of A on C.
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Proof. First note that relative to arbitrary w,
|C|= |C|(|A|+1−|A|) = |C|(|A|+ |¬A|) = |C||A|+ |C||¬A|= |C ◦A|+ |C ◦¬A|
For arbitrary nonclassical probability P, there’s an underlying credence-over-worlds c





c(w)(|C ◦A|+ |C ◦¬A|)





c(w)|C ◦¬A|= P(C ◦A)+P(C ◦¬A)
as required.
B. Corollary. P(C) = P(C|A)P(A)+P(C|¬A)P(¬A). Follows immediately from the above
by the ◦-ratio formula for conditional probability.
Recall that Γ is a nonclassical partition if in each world, the sum of the truth values of the
propositions in Γ is 1 (thus our assumption that |¬A|= 1−|A| ensured that A,¬A was a
partition). Then replicating the above proof delivers:
A. Generalized Lemma. P(C) = ∑γ∈Γ P(C ◦ γ), so long as Γ is a partition.
B. Generalized Corollary. P(C) = ∑γ∈Γ P(C|γ)P(γ), so long as Γ is a partition.
It’s nice to have this general form since there are some settings (supervaluational semantics for
example) where the truth values of A and ¬A don’t sum to 1; the partition-form is still
applicable even though the first result is not.
Another useful result is that, if PC is the probability that arises from P by updating on C, then
PC(A|B) = P(A|B◦C). This follows straightforwardly from the ratio formula. For:









As an application, we can use the above results together with the basic convex-combination
characterization of nonclassical probabilities to derive the following two ‘expert principles’ :32
P(S|t(S) = x) = x
P(S) = ∑
x
x ·P(t(S) = x)
32Compare Reflection (van Fraassen, 1984) and the Principal Principle (Lewis, 1980). Recall that |t(S) = x|w = 1
iff |S|w = x; otherwise it takes value 0. The second displayed summation makes sense if x takes finitely many values
in [0,1]; otherwise we will have to switch to integral formulations.
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For the first, the characterization of conditional probabilities, and expansion by the convex
combination characterization and the definition of ◦ gives:
P(S|t(S) = x) =
P(S◦ t(S) = x)
P(t(S) = x)
=
∑w c(w)|S◦ t(S) = x|w
∑w c(w)|t(S) = x|w
=
∑w c(w)|S|w|t(S) = x|w
∑w c(w)|t(S) = x|w
But |t(S) = x|w takes value 1 at worlds where the truth value of S is x, and 0 otherwise. So we
can rewrite the above summing over those worlds where its truth value is indeed x. And of











The second of the two expert principles follows from the first by the generalized corollary
above, applied to the partition given by all sentences of the form t(S) = x. The net result is a
derivation of the ‘expert’ principle that, for rational believers, one’s degree of belief in S
should match one’s expectation of its truth value. (In an earlier slogan, we used a similar
‘expectational’ gloss on nonclassical probabilities—but that required appeal to the underlying
credence distribution over worlds. The result here is formulated purely in terms of the
sentential probability P, and matches one standard classical way of calculating the expected
value of a random variable t.)
This all looks promising. On the other hand, there are some surprising divergences from how
we might expect a conditional probability to behave. Conditional probability so generalized
does not guarantee that P(A|A) = 1. Consider the Symmetric loaded Kleene setting. Suppose
all credence is invested in a world w in which A has truth value 0.5. It turns out by the recipe
above that P(A|A) = 0.5.33 This is surprising! Here is an application: probabilistic
Independence is standardly defined as holding between A and B when P(A|B) = P(A). But in
the case just mentioned, P(A|A) = 0.5 = P(A), so A will be probabilistically independent of
itself. This shows that the epistemic significance of independence (so defined) and the use of
conditional probabilities in confirmation theory more generally will need to be looked at
carefully.34
7 Jeffrey-style Decision theory
An important application of probability is within the theory of rational decision making. We
want to say something about a decision situation taking the following form: there are a range
of actions A. There are factors S ∈ Γ, which fix the consequences of the action. Γ form a
partition, and we are uncertain which element of that partition obtains. We are in a position to
33Multiplying the underlying credence by the truth value of A in any world other than w gives 0; at w it gives 0.5.
Renormalizing takes this back up to 1—the underlying credence distribution is unchanged, so P(A|A) = PA(A) =
P(A) = 0.5.
34Thanks to Al Hájek for this example. Note, however, that even in the classical case, A can be probabilistically
independent of itself if it has probability 1. Even in the classical case, this is a little strange—-what we see here is
that in the nonclassical case the phenomenon cannot be confined to cases where A initially has an extremal value.
21
Probability and nonclassical logic J. Robert G. Williams
judge the desirability of the total course of events, representable by A∧S. But our uncertainty
over which S obtains means that we have work to do to in order to figure out the desirability of
A itself.
Jeffrey’s decision theory (Jeffrey, 1965) provides a way to calculate the desirability D of a
course of action, from the desirability of the outcomes, plus one’s subjective probabilities. The
desirability of the action is a weighted average of the desirability of the outcomes, with the





Notice the crucial role given to conditional probabilities.
The application of probabilities within the theory of decision making is important, and if we
couldn’t recover a sensible account, this would render the whole enterprise of nonclassical
(subjective) probability less interesting. As a proof of principle, I’ll show that Jeffrey’s recipe
can indeed be generalized. I do not claim here to justify this as the right theory of decision in
the nonclassical setting, but just to show that such theories are available.
Here’s one way in which the Jeffrey decision rule can arise. Start by introducing a valuation
function from worlds to reals, v—intuitively, a measure of how much we’d like the world in




Now, one might wonder if this is the right way to define desirability; but there is no question
that it is well-defined in terms of the specific underlying valuation v. Now take any partition Γ
of sentences (in the generalized sense of partition of the previous section). By the corollary in
that section, applied to the nonclassical probability PA that arises from conditioning on A, we
have:
P(w|A) = PA(w) = ∑
S∈Γ
PA(S)PA(w|S)
Using another fact noted there, PA(w|S) = P(w|S◦A), and putting these two together and


















This is the exact analogue of the Jeffrey rule. So valuations over worlds allow us to define a
notion of desirability that satisfies the generalized form of Jeffrey’s equation.
What of the axioms for Jeffrey-Bolker decision theory? I won’t investigate these here, but I
will note that at least some require modification. For example, the ‘averaging’ axiom of
Jeffrey-Bolker decision theory tells us that if A and B are inconsistent, then if A ≻ B, then
A ≻ (A∨B)≻ B. But on a supervaluational model of decison theoretic utility constructed as
above, this can fail. Consider a situation where the value assigned to w and u is 1 in each case,
and where |A|w = |¬A|w = 0 and |A|u = 1, |¬A|u = 0. In a supervaluational setting, |A∨¬A| is
1 at any world. Then D(A) = 1, D(¬A) = 0 but D(A∨¬A) = 2, a violation of the axiom. The
underlying issue, I suspect, is that the axiom is written on the assumption that when A and B
are mutually exclusive, they form a partition of A∨B—which is perfectly true in a classical
setting, but fails in the supervaluational setting. What can be read off the definitions above is
that whenever (i) C is such that A and B form a partition of it (i.e. ∀w, |C|w = |A|w + |B|w), and
(ii) A◦C ≻ B◦C, then we have A◦C ≻C ≻ B◦C. This has the standard axiom as a special
case, once classical assumptions are added.
8 Alternative approaches
Having explored the interaction of nonclassicality and probability under the understanding of
those notions identified in section 1, this section takes a step back and considers briefly how
things might look if we varied our starting assumptions.
The first variation we will consider concerns the items to which probabilities attach. We have
been talking as if both probabilities and logical properties attach to sentences. We emphasized
earlier that the focus on linguistic bearers is inessential—all the above could be transferred to
probabilities and logic pertaining to Fregean thoughts, Russellian structures, and similar
fine-grained ‘propositions’. However, a very common approach to probability theory takes the
objects of probabilities to be coarse-grained. For example, one finds a probability defined in
terms of a triple (Ω,F,P), where Ω is a set (the ‘sample space’), the event space F is an
algebra of subsets of Ω, and P is a function from F to real numbers. We then have the familiar
Kolmogorov axioms:
P1. (Non-negativity) ∀E ∈ F,P(E) ∈ R≥0
P2. (Normalization) P(Ω) = 1
23
Probability and nonclassical logic J. Robert G. Williams
P3. (Additivity) ∀D,E ∈ F with D and E disjoint, P(D∪E) = P(D)+P(E)
On one reading, Ω could be the set of possible worlds, and then F would be coarse grained
propositions in the sense of Lewis (1986) and Stalnaker (1984): sets of possible worlds. Lewis
and Stalnaker argue that coarse-grained entities such as these are the objects of attitudes—a
radical and minority position that means that even ordinary agents cannot take different
attitudes to necessarily equivalent propositions. (An intermediate position here is to allow
fine-grained entities as the objects of attitudes, so that different attitudes to necessarily
equivalent claims are possible, but insist that ideal agents’ degrees of belief across mentalese
sentences should be such that it induces a probability function across the coarse-grained
propositions such sentences express.) The interesting thing about this setting from our
perspective is that logic seems to have disappeared from view. To be sure, we have analogues
of ‘inconsistency’ (disjointness)—but the classicality is not explicit.
A natural diagnosis is that classical logic is tacitly built into this framework—by the
assumption that the event space F forms a Boolean algebra. Quantum probabilities are
developed exactly on this diagnosis on the (highly contentious) quantum logic approaches to
quantum mechanics. Quantum events are held to form a non-distributive lattice, corresponding
to the structure of subspaces of Hilbert space, rather than to the structure of a subsets of a
classical sample space (Hughes, 1992, ch.8,9). Probabilities attaching to these quantum events
will be distinctively ‘nonclassical’.35 More generally, to generate nonclassical probabilities we
consider all sorts of alternative algebraic structures for the event space, and study analogues of
the standard probability axioms in that setting. Algebraic logic provides a rich set of resources
for those interested in pursuing this approach (Jansana, 2011). The variation of the algebra can
be radical (replacing Boolean by Heyting algebras, for example) or it could be more minor
(minor variations in the standard closure conditions of the algebra, for example).
In the discussions in previous sections, at various points I assumed an underlying space of
‘worlds’ at which sentences take truth values, one of which is ‘actual’, and determines a
definite truth-value distribution. The final formulations are often statable without making this
assumption (hence those formulations are available as a piece of formalism even to one who
rejects the above), but it was freely used in their motivation and justification. It’s worth bearing
in mind that some of the more radical motivations for nonclassicism might make this
assumption questionable. For example, the advocates of quantum logic interpret the
Kochen-Specker theorems as ruling out this kind of picture; a Dummettian anti-realist about
the past might find it hard to accommodate; and in his work developing a nonclassical logic to
evade the liar paradox, Field (2008) specifically argues against the idea there is a definite
distribution of actual (even nonclassical) truth values. Perhaps the algebraic approach, together
with a philosophical interpretation of what the items in the ‘event space’ are to be, will seem to
these theorists a more attractive philosophical foundation than the one sketched here.
We’ve just considered alternative approaches to our question that vary the objects of
probabilities. Another alternative is to vary what ‘probability’ is to mean. Now, some
interpretations of probability are tightly connected with epistemic issues in a way that allows
35The Hilbert space structure and the numbers assigned are common ground in quantum mechanics; but other
approaches will offer alternative interpretations of the formalism—for example, identifying some Boolean subal-
gebra as the ‘real’ event space, with standard classical probabilities defined across it, with numbers assigned to
points outside this subalgebra given an alternative physical intepretation.
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much of the above discussion to go through. Evidential probabilities, as in (Williamson, 2000)
are a case in point. Prima facie we expect that our evidence can discriminate between
necessarily equivalent propositions. I may have strong evidence for the liquid in my glass
being water, without having evidence that it is H2O. This makes a fine-grained setting natural
(though a coarse-grained theorist may respond instead by allowing ‘possible worlds’ into the
sample space that are not metaphysically possible). The nonclassicist who rejects Patchy being
red or not red certainly seems to need a treatment on which this does not get assigned
evidential probability 1. There’s still some plausibility in the claim that assignments of
evidential probability can’t be accuracy dominated; and that setting betting odds according to
the evidence shouldn’t lead to a sure loss. So while the material certainly needs to be examined
carefully and reworked under the new interpretation, it still seems directly relevant.
By contrast, under an interpretation of probability as objective chance, the parameters of the
discussion are changed more radically. First, one has to decide what the vehicles of chance are.
Unlike belief, there’s little motivation to think that necessarily equivalent propositions should
be able to take different probabilities. That makes the coarse-grained formulation of
probability, on which chances attach to sets of possible worlds, a natural one. This takes us
back to the issues discussed earlier in this setting, whereby nonclassicality has to impact, if at
all, in the algebraic structure of event space. On the other hand, we may still want to make
sense of thought and talk about the objective chance of vaguely-specified events. In ordinary
life, we might want to know about the chance of a ball in a bag being red. In special sciences,
chances may attach to macro-events e, such that some physically possible course of
micro-events will make it vague whether e obtains. The vagueness blocks a straightforward
translation into the obvious coarse-grained setting. Likewise, theses that connect chance to
subjective belief, such as the Principal Principle, are often stated in a way that presupposes a
common domain of entities to which both degrees of belief and objective chances attach. I take
the moral of this to be that even if the underlying chancy phenomena are best thought of as
pertaining to coarse-grained events or propositions, we may owe an account of an induced
chance-function across fine-grained propositions or sentences. At this point the main thread of
discussion in this article is again relevant. The nonclassicist who rejects the claim that patchy
is red or not red, certainly won’t want to say that the objective chance of patchy being red or
not red is one. So if this chance-attribution is well-formed at all, it seems to require a
nonclassical objective chances. Of course, the earlier motivations for the particular
formulations of nonclassical probabilities (such as the Dutch book and Accuracy arguments)
presupposed the subjective interpretation. We might hope nevertheless to motivate
nonclassical probabilities as formulations of objective chances by way of the Principal
Principle, plus nonclassical probabilism about degrees of belief; the nonclassical analogue of
the project carried out in (Lewis, 1980).
There are plenty of other reinterpretations of probability to consider. In each case, the
nonclassical probabilities we’ve been looking at are an obvious resource, but as has been
illustrated, the details matter.
9 Conclusions
To recap the main points of our discussion:
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A. Nonclassical probabilities can be viewed as convex combinations of nonclassical truth
values, and standard principles of probability can often be carried over to the
nonclassical case if we substitute an appropriate nonclassical logic for the classical one.
The appropriate nonclassical logical entailment can be generally characterized as one
guaranteeing no drop in truth value. In section 6, we showed that truth values behave as
‘experts’ relative to these probability functions.
B. The truth values concerned should be thought of as the cognitive loads of the
nonclassical truth status. But the general recipe may break down if (a) one does not
endorse a semantically driven conception of logic (one will not have ‘truth statuses’ to
play with); (b) one does not regard the statuses as cognitively loaded; or (c) the
cognitively loads are not representable as real-valued degrees of belief. As discussed in
section 7, this approach is also undermined if one insists on defining probabilities not
over fine-grained truth-bearers (whether sentences, thoughts or structured propositions)
but over coarse-grained, algebraically structured events or truth conditions.
C. The nonclassical probabilities so defined can be justified as constraints on rational belief
via analogues of Dutch book and accuracy-domination arguments.
D. A notion of conditional probability can be characterized, that preserves important
features of classical conditional probability. It satisfies a ratio formula, using a
connective that is available in some but not all nonclassical settings.
E. An analogue of Jeffrey’s recipe for calculating desirability of actions with respect to an
arbitrary partition of states is available.
F. Though the discussion is conducted in the context of a subjective interpretation of
probability, the theory of nonclassical probabilities that emerges is a resource for
probability theory under other interpretations, though each application raises new
philosophical issues.
This provides a rich field for further investigation:
A. Studying axiomatizations of nonclassical probabilities is an open-ended task. Can we
extend the results of Paris, Mundici et al, and get a more general sense of what set of
axioms are sufficient to characterize convex combinations of truth values? One key step
was outlined earlier: to switch from ‘immanent’ axiomatizations (like Additivity) to
purely logical ones (like Recarving).
B. We have focused on cases where ‘truth values’ (the cognitive loading of nonclassical
truth statuses) take a particularly tractable form: represented by reals in [0,1]. Can we
get a notion of nonclassical probability in a more general setting, where the cognitive
loads are not linear ordered, or where some truth statuses are missing such loading
altogether? Perhaps the notion of expectations of non-real valued random variables may
provide a lead here.
C. What is the relation between the cognitive loading of a nonclassical truth status
(appealed to directly in the accuracy-domination argument) and the pragmatic loading
(relevant to the generalized Dutch book argument). Must they coincide? If so, why?
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D. How much of the theory of conditional probability transfers to the nonclassical setting?
Can confirmation theory, in particular, be preserved in the nonclassical setting?
E. Many foundational and formal questions about nonclassical decision theory deserve
exploration. Are analogues of classical representation theorems available, relative to a
set of rational constraints on qualitative preference? What are the appropriate
generalizations of the qualitative constraints of Jeffrey-Bolker theory? And can other
forms of decision theory find expression in the nonclassical setting?
F. There are many possible interpretations of probability for which we could raise
questions analogous to those discussed here. The chance and evidential interpretations
have only briefly been discussed—and there’s plenty more to say about these, and the
relation between different forms of probability in the nonclassical setting. One
particularly interesting interpretation to study is the logical intepretations of probability,
on which the aim is to articulate the degree to which one propositions supports another,
as a putative generalization of the total support captured by ordinary logical
consequence. Surely this should interact directly with a nonclassical logic.
It’s worth emphasizing a remark we made right at the start. It is not only convinced revisionists
that need to be concerned about these issues. Anyone not dogmatically opposed to logical
revision needs to take interest. For, prima facie, if one is open to the possibility that excluded
middle fails in some cases, for example, then one shouldn’t invest full confidence in each of its
instances. And yet, it does not seem that one is irrational in harbouring such doubts, as the
interpretation of classical probabilities as constraints on rational belief would
suggest.Interpreting specific nonclassical probabilities as constraints on rational belief is likely
to be problematic for analogous reasons.
Now, perhaps one could argue that in the end, such doubts manifest a lack of perfect, ideal
rationality—so at least, the dogmatist must argue. I find this somewhat implausible. To begin
with, it may be (as Putnam argued long ago) that the issue of which logic is correct is a broadly
empirical one. Whatever one thinks of quantum logic as an putative exemplar of this, I would
be surprised if we were never faced with scientific theory choice between total theories
embedding incompatible logico-semantic packages. There’s certainly a proliferation of such
packages available in metaphysics; and many of us are naturalists enough to think that
empirical evidence just as much as apriori reflection is holistically relevant to theory choice in
metaphysics. It would seem to me a strike against a theory of rational belief if it can’t
represent rational uncertainty between such physical or metaphysical systems, and the gradual
accumulation of evidence for one or the other. But set such considerations aside. The
dogmatists need to argue, not just that there is an absence of possible evidence in favour of
unfavoured logics, but that in some ideal limit there is positive evidence for their favoured
system, sufficiently strong to require rational certainty. Why think that our total evidence, and
superhuman processing power, would convey total conviction in the correctness of classical
logic, or indeed any other logical system?
This uncertainty challenges all the forms of probabilism we have been discussing. Uncertainty
over what the right logic is can lead to attitudes to individual sentences that are condemned by
all the probability theories based on logics one is open to. Suppose that I divide my credence
50/50 over L-worlds and L∗ worlds. And suppose S is true at all L worlds and false at all L∗
worlds. Then I should be 50/50 in S. But this is condemned by the ‘rational constraints’
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associated by L and by L∗—L says I should have credence 1; and L∗ says I should have
credence 0.
So what can we offer an anti-dogmatist? One possibility is to drop the assumption that there is
a space of truth value distributions (classical or otherwise) over which to define probabilities,
independent of one’s doxastic state. Perhaps the theory of subjective probability should be
developed relative to a set of truth value distributions Z, that the ideal agent regards as open
possibilities. The arguments above can be used to characterize convex combinations of truth
value over the possibilites in Z, and a consequence relation defined via the no drop
characterization used before. If the open possibilities include as many varieties of truth value
distributions as has been suggested, then the Z-logic will be weak indeed, and the constraints
on rational degrees of belief also weak. But it is a virtue of the framework we’ve been using
that it applies even to this radically minimal setting, and many of the results carry over.36
Suppose we decided to theorize about ideally rational belief in this way. Even if the logic and
constraints on rational belief are radically minimal, perhaps the majority of a sensible person’s
credence will be devoted to some C ⊂ Z which contains—say—only classical truth value
distributions. And if rational degrees of belief have to be convex combinations of truth value,
then we do get the non-trivial result that the degrees of belief conditional on C have to meet the
classical constraints. Mutatis mutandis for other interesting regions of the open possibilities
Z—the Kleene possibilities K, say. So even though the statable constraints on ideally rational
unconditional belief may be rather minimal, it implicitly inherits much richer constraints of
rationality, in that it must be such that the updated probabilities PC(·) be classical probabilities;
PK(·) be Kleene probabilities and so forth.
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Hájek, Alan. Summer 2012. ‘Interpretations of probability’. In: Zalta, Edward N. (ed), The
stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. This article first written in winter 2002 and was last
updated in Spring 2012 http:
//plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/probability-interpret/.
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